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   Enterprise risk management (ERM) has grown in significance since the mid-1990s to 
become a key resource in the conceptualization and design of risk management systems. We 
argue that this emphasis is misplaced and contributes to the problem of a divide between analysis 
and action.  ERM may be relevant for regulators and others in need of proof of good governance, 
but its formulations have become progressively detached from the reality of modern financial 
organizations. We argue that buy-side risk management practices provide an alternative 
conception of risk management which is more grounded in operations and which avoids the 
problems of actionability created by controls-based ERM. 
    1 
The End of Enterprise Risk Management 





  The future of risk management has been imagined as a technocratic ideal in which a 
person sits in front of a multiple computer screens with their hands slowly moving the dials as 
the risk information flows through the system. The prevailing image is that of mission control at 
NASA, the control room at a nuclear power plant or a trader in a Wall Street dealing room.  On 
this view, the holism of risk management demands an information infrastructure capable of 
processing all the risks which impact on organizational strategy.   The ideal is also that such 
systems in financial organizations monitor, validate, protect and adjust levels of capital 
‘adequate’ to the risks of the business.    
  This image reflects an ultimate hope that risks can in fact be managed in holistic way on 
an enterprise wide basis, with a strong presence at the center of the organization, often called the 
Risk Management Division of the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) function.  In support of 
this aspiration, a number of generic standards and guidelines have been published by a wide 
variety of bodies which frame risk management as an organizational process (Power, 2007).  
    Out of these ideas and aspirations, so-called ‘enterprise’ risk management systems 
(ERM) began to be developed from the early 90s onwards. One example is a program which was 
used at Citibank known as Windows on Risk
1.  The Windows, as they were called, were 
summary views of discreet risk categories that were extracted from independent but highly 
developed underlying risk management systems that could be used to drill down to the 
transaction level detail.  The innovation of Windows on the risk process was the use of scenarios 
to evaluate multiple risks simultaneously and then to mandate specific action plans.  However, 
the path of development of ERM has taken it in a somewhat different direction from these first 
steps.  Today ERM has been fashioned with a predominant analytical emphasis on the summary 
top-level, enterprise view without the orientation towards action of these early efforts.  
  We argue here that ERM in its various manifestations is susceptible to misplaced 
emphasis and various pitfalls.   In essence, if ERM is to be implemented in a way which helps an 
entity get to where it wants to go, it needs to have a bias toward action which many applications 
                                                 
1 One of the authors, Martin, was involved in the development of this program as a risk manager at Citibank.    2 
currently lack.  Existing top-down designs for ERM have an obvious attraction for regulators 
seeking to make senior management accountable, but such approaches are neither realistic nor 
pragmatic; they are not grounded in the demand for management action, which is always 
somehow ‘outside’ the framework.  Even supporters of ERM admit that organizations find it 
easier to populate risk maps than to populate action columns on spreadsheets. 
    Critical influences on the shape of ERM during the 1990s have come from major 
regulatory programs, particularly the significance accorded to internal control environments 
under pillar 2 of Basel 2 and the ICA regime for insurers in the United Kingdom.  These and 
other regulatory systems understandably looked to existing controls-based frameworks as 
benchmarks of good practice.   In particular, in the United States, the design developed by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission – Internal Control – 
Integrated Framework published in 1991 has exerted considerable influence over all subsequent 
thinking in the field throughout the world.  An institutionally strong and diffusible conception of 
ERM has emerged from the tradition of internal control practices.  More recently another strong 
influence has been the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the United States, which has been the 
subject of an avalanche of criticism.  While our focus here is not to review the extensive body of 
dialogue on Sarbanes Oxley, we note that since its inception, a significant focus around this 
legislation has been to enable its application and focus to be more risk-based. The Turnbull 
report in the UK gave further emphasis to the principles of controls, independent notification and 
reliance on control.  
  Yet such thinking has created some troublesome consequences.  A model of regulatory 
assurance, or an ‘illusion of control’ (Holt, 2004), has been created by ERM designs; as long as 
risk has a control and a report or person dedicated to it – then somehow the risk has been 
mitigated.   While there have been major developments in quantitative risk management tools in 
the financial sector, partly driven by the emergence of information technology capable of making 
finance theory operative, this pillar 2 emphasis on controls and ‘risk governance’ has had 
profound effects on the organizational shape of risk management (Mengle, 2003).  It has become 
a part of regulatory common-sense. 
  The rise of this regulatory conception of risk management, with its origins in control 
thinking, can be traced in part to scandals and to policy demands for preventative solutions.   
COSO (1991) itself was a response to fraudulent financial reporting in the late 1980s and the    3 
Group of Thirty drew on its ideas when it published its guidance on the governance of 
derivatives following the major losses in a short term account held by Orange County, (Group of 
Thirty, 1993).  While regulatory regimes drew on these internal control systems, they also 
transformed them via processes of formalization and codification.   In 2004, COSO updated and 
redesignated this control framework as Enterprise Risk Management, but the underlying logic 
remained unchanged.  
  In the next section, we elaborate further the key issues regarding these shortcomings of 
current ERM thinking and practice.   This is followed by an example of a contrasting style of risk 
management visible in the work of a buy-side investment management firm.  Finally, we explain 
why regulator driven ERM frameworks are a potential source of risk, and argue for the need to 
find applications more sensitive to organizational demands. 
 
 
2. ERM as Command and Control 
 
  The essential structure of ERM has become a familiar part of the risk practitioner 
landscape.  The underlying model derives control and risk management activity from the 
ultimate mission of the organization.  This logic has a clarity and appeal which is undeniable.    
Thus ERM prescribes that organizations must analyze the risks to their overall objectives and 
determine mitigation activity based on clarity about their appetite or tolerance for the residual 
risks associated with their goals and sub-goals.  In organizations where control activity has 
historically been ‘out of control’ as an autonomous activity, establishing a rational relationship 
between control investments, organizational objectives and risk appetite has an obvious 
attraction.  At the same time, ERM articulates a strategic significance and potential for this 
control-based conception of risk management which it could not have done in the 1980s. 
  Even allowing for some variations, this idea of ERM has become part of the 
contemporary common sense of risk management.  It is a model shared both by the large 
professional services firms and by regulators.  It essentially reflects a model of organizational 
control which is similar in many respects to the principles of scientific management espoused by 
F.W. Taylor, which in turn influenced softer managerial forms, such as quality assurance.   Just 
as Taylor appears outmoded today, ERM is deeply  hierarchical in a way which is out of line 
with a great deal of recent thinking about organizations, cultures, networks and strategic    4 
alliances.  For example, although the COSO (2004) standard acknowledges the limitations of risk 
management and control systems, such as their vulnerability to collusion and discretionary 
override, its lack of organizational realism may be the most significant source of risk.  This lack 
of realism is reinforced by regulatory demands at the operational level for the highly rationalized 
images of risk management which ERM frameworks provide. 
  It does not take much organization theory to question the assumptions underlying this 
misapplied notion of ERM.  For example, Hood (1996) shows very clearly that models which 
depend on the notion of a clear risk appetite or tolerance level have an essentially ‘thermostatic’ 
or mechanical character.  They assume that limits can be well-defined and can provide automatic 
and clear feedback to risk operatives who can make adjustments.   Yet such models which work 
well for heating systems fail in organizations because human beings can disagree about 
acceptable tolerances or fail to interpret the signals properly when such limits are breached (as in 
the case of Three Mile Island).  In a similar way, March and Shapira (1987) have shown that that 
decision makers do not first calculate risks and then choose among alternatives, as ERM suggests.   
They are also predisposed to assume that risk is manageable in a rational way, something which 
ERM encourages.  Indeed, ERM is a mode of framing risk management which, despite 
qualifications, assumes that mastery is possible. 
  In the field of financial services, most risk management innovations arose from the sell 
side (at banks, investment banks and brokers) because of the sizeable principal risks they take 
and because of regulatory attention to conduct of business and systemic stability.  Once COSO 
(1991) had been established as a legitimate standard, gaining accepted by the SEC, it began to 
acquire dominant regulatory currency, influencing the development of frameworks and templates 
overseas.  Even apparently competing standards share much of the same structure for the 
organization of risk management thinking.   Accordingly, the sell-side firms along with many 
other organizations advised by a growing consulting industry, favored and built ERM-style 
command and control organizations with elaborate structures of internal risk accountability.   
  A key aspect of the development of ERM has been the extension of value at risk (VaR) 
techniques to determine the risk capital needed at the aggregate level for regulatory and 
managerial purposes.   However, VaR has its origins in the search for risk adjusted rates of return 
at the level of specific transactions for real clients; portfolio impacts are a macro effect of these 
transactions.  So it is widely argued that VaR techniques are far more suitable to measure the risk    5 
of individual positions on transactions and that there are also severe limitations of using an 
aggregate VaR measure. For example, there are very often attractive diversification benefits from 
combining portfolios that VaR does not always calculate properly. A strict reliance on only VaR 
will fail to provide a useful picture of extreme market conditions or the behavior of complex 
transactions and instruments under a wide range of circumstances which have not been 
historically observed.   
  By contrast in buy side firms, boundaries, or risk appetites, are driven from the 
transactions level by client guidelines – hence the management of risk is driven primarily from 
the ‘bottom-up’ by the fiduciary perspective of individual clients, rather than by some aggregate 
objective of the firm as whole.  Relative fund performance to a benchmark is often more 
significant for clients than absolute performance judged by a universal risk appetite policy.  In 
addition, portfolio managers must have discretionary execution capabilities in order to keep up 
with ever-changing market prices. Time of execution is measured today in microseconds. As 
long as the portfolio manager is within the investment guidelines mandated by the client, adding 
a transaction approval process actually increases risk.  In short, one cannot control investment 
risk with a command and control paradigm like ERM on the buy side. 
  It is certainly reasonable to define enterprise risk as the risk that threatens the viability of 
the enterprise. Most of the classic cases of financial collapse and fraud have been followed by 
regulatory intervention to correct behavior, in particular by enhancing internal controls.   In 
Investment Management firms the dramatology of failure is different; client risk is the main 
focus and the driving issue in maintaining reputation.  If the client loses confidence in the 
enterprise’s ability to manage their money effectively – for whatever the reason – the enterprise 
will quickly go out of business.   In such a buy-side client focused world, ERM can only assume 
an ecological form which embodies rules “for the common good” of the enterprise.  For example, 
client mandates may dictate that a buy-side firm should establish a maximum percent holding of 
an issuer. ERM should involve setting up specific “speed bumps” at certain levels to evaluate 
position pill provisions, regulatory filings requirements, liquidity, and relative position size 
versus competitors.  In short, there is no gap between ERM and portfolio management; there is 
no need to demand the ‘embeddedness’ of risk management, as the UK Turnbull report does, 
because unembeddedness is unthinkable from the business point of view.    6 
  Similarly, in the context of a banking organization, ERM should take on a virtual 
environmental view in that “banks are mirrors of their environment”, i.e., when there is a good 
economic environment their customers (consumers and corporations), do well. ERM would 
involve having a view of the environment and setting up “tripwires” to ensure that inflection 
points are noted and that the organization is not lulled into a view of the environment that has 
changed. For example, if a bank has a large mortgage portfolio which has on average a 60% 
loan-to-value underwriting criteria, when real estate values drop 5%, there should be a required 
time-out to review the portfolio. In essence, this kind of business-driven ERM requires the 
specific monitoring of external reference points that cause reflection and action.   The mistaken 
assumption of control-based ERM is to presuppose that control indicators or Key Risk Indicators 
(KRIs) somehow speak for themselves. Rather the bias to action must already be embedded in 
triggers which demand concrete actions, initially in the form of mandated discussion.  As Holt 
(2004: 261) suggests, risk management should be seen ‘not as a way of fixing types of problem 
but as a mechanism for encountering problems’.   The emphasis should be less on orderly models 
of representation and more on changes in KRIs as a provocation to the business. 
  In summary, control-based ERM as favored by regulators has less than optimal 
practicality for organizations because of its origins in frameworks like COSO which in effect 
assumes and produces a gap between analysis and action (Samad-Khan, 2005).  Such 
frameworks do of course have representational functionality in so far as they provide what the 
regulator wants to see; they provide organizations with a way to signal conformity to abstract 
design principles for a risk management process, and they make this process ‘auditable’  (Power, 
2007).   But while these ERM frameworks are appealing to regulators and others, they give rise 
to significant practical challenges at the operational level, despite heroic attempts to align them 
in spreadsheets and risk maps. 
 
3. A New Paradigm?  The Case of Buy-Side Risk Management 
 
  Is it possible to generalize the case of buy-side risk management in just the same way as 
has happened historically on the sell side?   What would our risk management discussions look 
like today if frameworks like COSO had never existed?  In a statement of draft risk principles for 
asset managers (Buy Side Risk Managers Forum and Capital Market Risk Advisors, 2006), a 
telling footnote reports that ‘aspirational programs are themselves a form of risk’.   The    7 
implication is that programs which build in a gap between analysis and actionability are a kind of 
operational risk.   These draft principles are interesting in another sense.   They are necessarily 
principles-based because the unique position of specific asset managers means that a rules-based 
approach would be instantly meaningless.   In contrast most ERM frameworks lend themselves 
to rules-based realization. It might even be suggested that the problem of embedding risk 
management is exacerbated by the very frameworks designed to overcome it. 
  The ‘counter conception’ of risk management being advanced here is visible in the 
example of the buy-side risk management practices at AllianceBernstein (AB).  AB has a chief 
risk officer who reports to the President and Chief Operating Officer.  Each major geographical 
region (i.e., North America, Europe, Asia) has a senior risk manager.  This relatively small unit 
interacts closely with other control related units, including compliance, internal audit, IT and 
Legal.   In this AB model, the Portfolio Managers are fundamentally the first line managers of 
risk. They must understand the risk/reward trade-offs involved in their own investment decisions 
and how they become impaired when the market moves.  While never perfect, the AB risk 
approach aims to: 
 
•  Empower senior line managers with risk management responsibility and autonomy. 
•  Provide clear product definitions and investment boundaries to satisfy client expectations 
and stated risk appetites.  
•  Maintain a strong, centralized new product approval process. 
•  Create understandable policies and procedures and ensure they are adhered to. 
•  Design operations so that they are driven by client needs and expectations. This entails 
clarifying ambiguous investment guidelines and learning from errors to ensure they do 
not reoccur any place in the organization.  
•  Promote extensive communication and dialogue about risk taking and risk management 
at all levels 
•  Sustain a governance process composed of various firm wide and business unit specific 
risk committees. 
•  Implement an industrial strength compliance function. 
•  Integrate the risk functions with compliance and internal audit.   
    8 
  The implications of this model are that the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) is not the head of an 
ERM bureaucracy of controls, but has ‘Head of household’ responsibilities which focus on 
specific enterprise and reputation risks.  The CRO and a small, experienced team determine 
house limits in terms of counterparty exposure, and share ownership of these limits with 
managers; they provide views on who the company does business with; and they are involved in 
new product and financial instrument approval.  In addition to this advisory and boundary setting 
role, the CRO exercises oversight responsibilities by subjecting portfolio management to a 
quarterly review to ensure that all client accounts have a statistical profile that conforms to the 
mandate for which the firm was engaged, and that the variation among with identical mandates 
falls within acceptable boundaries.  In addition, the CRO is actively involved in operational risk 
activities since errors can undermine the confidence of clients. 
  Overall, the CRO team at AB operates as an internal business consultant which involves 
senior management in the oversight process via committee structures.  The model is highly 
interactive; risk management is an ongoing organizational conversation which may on occasion 
produce tension. It includes senior management, compliance, internal audit, the Board’s internal 
audit committee and regulators.  The dynamics of the approach are critical.  It does not begin 
with an abstract regulatory standard, but with the transactions that serve clients.  Command and 
control is not part of daily routines in which actionability is dispersed.   
  The general conception of risk management underlying these activities at AB, though by 
no means perfect and without frictions, is very different in form from some of the other 
approaches used in the industry which favor centralized and prescriptively detailed conceptions 
of ERM.  In place of creating a dashboard for an entire risk universe, a project which creates 
endless worries about the completeness of universe description, the focus is on surfacing 
problems as they arise and on resolving everyday issues by empowering the entire organization 
to be risk managers.  The measure of success is not the ability to prove and demonstrate control 
universes via elaborate spreadsheets, but a singular focusing on doing the right things at the 
transactional level.   
    
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
    9 
  It is perhaps dangerous to substitute one overgeneralization for another.  However, risk 
management as practiced at AB and other buy-side firms has something systemic to tell us which 
is different in fundamental respects from the standard ERM approaches currently in fashion.  
ERM requires in principle the identification of all risks facing an organization, a process which 
may not always be possible and which ties organizations up in creating bureaucratic trails to 
prove the quality of process.  This results in an expensive and potentially impractical description 
of what firms do down to the minutest detail, without prescriptions for action.  The production of 
evidence becomes more important than managing real risks.    In some cases this has also 
resulted in organizations adopting two kinds of risk management, one visible form for the 
regulator and one less visible form for the business.   
  It must be said that the top-down ERM approach being criticized does have a place in risk 
management – but only by exception when strategic or material issues may be concerned   It is 
both a poor descriptive and normative model for the everyday need to monitor changes to 
organizational risk profile.  ‘Top-down’ commanding approaches will certainly be relevant in 
emergencies, with regard to specific material transactions or to demonstrate board governance, 
but they lack relevance for monitoring day to day operations and are unsuitable for the 
decentralized structure of many contemporary organizations.  A more pragmatic prescription is a 
‘bottom-up’ approach based on defined freedoms to expand and trade subject to central tracking 
of relative performance that these activities remain within risk profile.   The analytic and 
pragmatic imperative is to monitor change.  Even good KRIs only tell the organization that 
something is changing; they must be part of defined organization prescriptions for action and 
review at different thresholds.   In contrast, hierarchies of controls reinforce the gap between 
analysis and action and create alienation between the risk function and the business.  
  It is not surprising that most existing ERM approaches embody a rather unrealistic and 
outdated theory of organizations – the birds’ eye view.   They have little to do with 
organizational realities and more to do with governance design.  COSO (2004) provides an 
idealized blueprint for an auditable risk management process, with an emphasis placed on senior 
management and top-down accountability. It is a prescription for a governance and 
accountability agenda rather than a guide to the risk management process (Power, 2004; 2007).   
Huge resources have been expended on establishing baseline control systems under Basel 2 pillar 
2 and under section 404 requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.   Now, following    10 
criticism, there is a move towards more ‘risk-based’ approaches.   Yet these risk-based 
approaches will bring very little change in the fundamental conception of risk management.   
There are of course professional interests at stake:  the COSO world suits accountants and 
consultants for whom the governance agenda of the 1990s has provided new markets.  Yet 
despite efforts to link ERM designs to strategy, this is a world focused more on structure than 
business dynamics, and more on the enterprise in the abstract rather on than product creation.    
  In sum, practices at AllianceBernstein provide an instructive example and challenge 
prevailing regulatory conceptions of ERM applications.  We suggest that these conceptions are 
the source of many difficulties organizations face in developing an intelligent risk management 
practice which is part of the transaction process.   Though not without difficulties, the problem of 
embeddedness and actionability is solved under this counter conception of risk management -  
because there was never a gap in the first place.   Control-based ERM remains attractive as a 
wrapper for risk governance which helps Boards discharge their duties, but it has little if nothing 
to say about managing risk at the point it is undertaken, and may be a source of risk to operations 
if it makes the risk function less credible in the business.   
  As for that risk person sitting before multiple computer screens turning dials and 
monitoring every risk in the enterprise – that individual has no place in the future of risk 
management.  What is required is nothing less than a critical transformation in our collective 
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